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closely related to their existing technological base and are
most likely to learn new skills in areas where they already
have prior knowledge. Some organizational research even
suggests that fast learning is sometimes disadvantageous
(Huber 1991). Since electronic commerce involves many
fundamental changes in business and IT practices
combined with extreme time pressures, the above
arguments imply that it can be extremely difficult for
organizations to develop significant levels of competence
in developing e-commerce capabilities in the available
time using internal resources alone. Hence, we argue that:

Abstract
This research-in-progress compares the effectiveness
of various governance mechanisms used by organizations
to implement e-commerce initiatives. The research uses
economic theories to develop refutable hypotheses
regarding the different governance mechanisms. The
hypotheses will be tested using an event-study
methodology.

Introduction
Organizations may choose from among a diverse
array of mechanisms to undertake e-commerce initiatives.
These include but are not limited to internal development,
grafting (Huber 1991), selective outsourcing and
complete outsourcing (Lacity and Willcocks 1998; Rao et
al. 1996). This study addresses the issue of studying the
comparative advantages of different governance
mechanisms used to implement e-commerce initiatives.

Hypothesis 1: Firms that decide to acquire technological
competence required to develop e-commerce capabilities
from outside sources will do better than firms that choose
to develop these skills internally.
Firms that choose to acquire e-commerce
capabilities from outside have a number of available
choices. They may graft knowledge (Huber 1991) by
hiring new organizational members who possess the
required knowledge not previously available within the
organization or by buying specific technology products.
Alternately, they may outsource the required services
from service vendors. The choice between grafting
knowledge versus outsourcing services from the market
comes down to the fundamental make vs. buy question
analyzed by transaction cost economists. Williamson’s
(Williamson 1989) analysis of this issue hinges around
the concept of asset specificity. Asset specificity is the
extent to which resources associated with one transaction
lose their value when deployed in another transaction. As
Williamson points out, asset specificity affects
governance costs and production costs.

Hypothesis development
In the last few years, the pace of technological
innovation in industry has become very rapid and is a
recurring theme in management literature (Bettis and Hitt
1995). Consequently, the need to compete on the basis of
time as a critical resource has been recognized in the last
decade or so (Quinn and Paquette 1990). For example,
Morris-Suzuki (Morris-Suzuki 1984) described as
“perpetual innovation” the rapid and continuous change
that has occurred as information-intensive technologies
have replaced older technologies. This change is so
pronounced in fact that authors such as Kalakota
(Kalakota and Robinson 1999) even suggest that the
principal source of competitive advantage in the “Internet
age” is constant adaptation of the business model itself.
This time sensitivity in the world of electronic commerce
and the Internet has even led to the coining of the term,
“Internet time” (Cusumano and Yoffie 2000).

Both these effects favour buying services from the
market (buy) when asset specificity is low and developing
capabilities (make) when asset specificity is high.
Therefore, following this analysis, the efficient
mechanism for firms to acquire e-commerce capabilities
is based on whether e-commerce capabilities are highly
transaction-specific or not significantly so. If e-commerce
capabilities are highly transaction-specific, transaction
cost analysis predicts that acquiring capabilities would be
the efficient governance mechanism and if e-commerce
capabilities were not transaction-specific, buying them
from the market, or outsourcing them would be the
efficient governing mechanism.

Electronic commerce is an innovation that requires
organizations to adapt and change, a process that requires
them to develop new skills and capabilities continuously
and at a very rapid pace. Developing these capabilities
internally requires learning, that has consistently been
found to be path dependent and time consuming. Cohen
and Levinthal provided the basic framework for this path
dependence of learning in their theory of absorptive
capacity (Cohen and Levinthal 1990). Teece (Teece 1998)
argues that firms tend to develop new resources in areas

One of the major driving forces behind the growth of
e-commerce and the Internet are open standards.
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1999). The methodology derives legitimacy from the
efficiency of capital markets (Fama et al. 1969). If an ecommerce outsourcing announcement is expected to
enhance future cash flows, the capital market would
respond favorably to
e-commerce outsourcing
announcements by firms. This response can then be
measured by the positive movements in stock prices
subsequent to the announcement.

Standards like TCP/ IP for communication, ODBC for
database transactions and other such standards facilitate
the exchange of information between diverse information
systems. Hence, systems that facilitate e-commerce and ebusiness over the Internet exhibit low asset-specificity
than systems like EDI and other proprietary information
exchange networks. As long as the services market for
electronic commerce in an industry is large enough, assetspecificity k as defined by Williamson (Williamson
1989), is low since the capabilities of a vendor in the
industry can be effectively redeployed with other clients.
Also, from the client’s point of view, if the number of
vendors is high, research has shown that clients do not
find a lock-in effect to a specific outsourcing vendor (Rao
et al. 1996). Hence in developing e-commerce
capabilities, technology outsourcing is a superior
governance mechanism compared to the acquisition/
grafting of capabilities. Hence:

Data
The event being studied is defined as “a public
announcement of an e-commerce outsourcing initiative by
a publicly traded company”. This data will be collected
from a full text search of company announcements during
the period November 1 1999 and December 31, 1999
from 2 leading news sources: PR Newswire and
Businesswire. These sources provide comprehensive
coverage of public announcements by firms and are
available on the Dow Jones Interactive database that can
be accessed electronically. After going through a number
of candidate announcements to identify a suitable search
string, we created the following search string:

Hypothesis 2: In developing e-commerce capabilities,
firms that outsource their technology functions perform
better than firms that acquire these capabilities.
Transaction cost economics (TCE) is often
complemented by Agency theory to investigate the
efficiency of governance modes (Williamson 1988).
Agency theory stresses the importance of measurement
costs and is based on two central constructs – information
asymmetry and task programmability. Programmable
tasks are routine activities that can be technically
decomposed and monitored in-house. If the tasks assigned
to agents (vendors) are not programmable, it lowers the
effectiveness of monitoring, increases measurement
uncertainty and reduces the efficiency of outsourcing.
This phenomenon has also been described in terms of the
complexity of product description and is independent of
asset specificity (Malone et al. 1987). Research suggests
that other factors being equal, products with complex
descriptions are more likely to be produced in-house than
obtained from the market primarily due to the cost of
communicating information about the product. Following
the above argument, firms are more likely to derive
advantage by selectively outsourcing their programmable
e-commerce requirements than by outsourcing complex
functions such as application development that involve
dynamic and complicated communications. Hence:

('electronic commerce' or 'e-commerce') and (develop
or subsidiary or division or internal or outsource or hire
or contract or provide or deliver or partner or acquire or
collaborate or buy or purchase or host or implement or
outsourcing or establish or construct or organize) and
Nasdaq
A search between December 14, 1999 and December
31, 1999 has resulted in 101 separate announcements. A
categorization of some of these announcements is as follows:
Table 1: Categorization of sample announcements
Firm description
Internet
professional
services firm
Online brokerage
Imaging services
firm
Global medical
company
Healthcare
intelligence
provider
Communications
soln. provider
Web-branding
firm
Life sciences
solution provider
Gift expressions
provider
Internet job site

Hypothesis 3: Firms that selectively outsource their
programmable e-commerce requirements will perform
better than firms that outsource complex requirements.

Methodology
In this research, we test the above hypotheses using
an event-study methodology to measure the impact of
decisions by firms to outsource their e-commerce
operations. Event study methodology is very useful tools
for management researchers because it obviates the need
to analyze accounting-based measures of profit
(McWilliams and Siegel 1997; Subramani and Walden
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Inhouse

Grafting

Selective
*

Complex

*
*
*
*

*
*
*
*
*

Loh, L., and Venkatraman, N. (1992). “Stock market
reaction to Information Technology outsourcing: An
event study.” , Center for Information systems research.

Following the standard event-study procedure (Fama
et al. 1969; Loderer and Mauer 1992; Loh and
Venkatraman 1992; McWilliams and Siegel 1997;
Subramani and Walden 1999), we will study the
cumulative abnormal returns to firms over an event
window surrounding the announcement date compared to
the average rate of return for the company’s stock over an
estimation interval.

Malone, T. W., Yates, J., and Benjamin, R. I. (1987).
“Electronic markets and electronic hierarchies.”
Communications of the ACM, 30(6), 484-497.
McWilliams, A., and Siegel, D. (1997). “Event studies in
management research: Theoretical and empirical issues.”
Academy of Management Journal, 40(3), 626-657.

Currently, we are collecting data on public
announcements that will be used for the study. We are
also developing a content-analytic classification scheme
to classify the announcements precisely (Krippendorf
1980; Meindl et al. 1985; Morris 1994; Salancik and
Meindl 1984).

Meindl, J. R., Ehrlich, S. B., and Dukerich, J. M. (1985).
“The Romance of Leadership.” Administrative Science
Quarterly, 30(1), 78-102.
Morris, R. (1994). “Computerized content analysis in
management research: A demonstration of advantages &
limitations.” Journal of Management, 20(4), 903-931.
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